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Abstract—In this paper, we model a complete-information
zero-sum game between a centralized detection network with
a multiple access channel (MAC) between the sensors and the
fusion center (FC), and a jammer with multiple transmitting
antennas. We choose error probability at the FC as the perfor-
mance metric, and investigate pure strategy equilibria for this
game, and show that the jammer has no impact on the FC’s error
probability by employing pure strategies at the Nash equilibrium.
Furthermore, we also show that the jammer has an impact on
the expected utility if it employs mixed strategies.
Index Terms—Detection Networks, Multiple Access Channels,
Jamming, Saddle-Point Equilibrium.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SYSTEM MODEL
Jamming attacks in detection networks have a significant
impact on today’s world due to the wide range of applications
of these networks [1]. Therefore, several attempts have been
made in the past literature to address jamming attacks in
detection networks. For more details, please refer to [2]–[4]
and citations within. In our past work, we have addressed
jamming attacks in the context of detection networks with
multiple access channels (MACs) [5], [6]. In particular, we
found equilibrium strategies numerically for a zero-sum game
between a centralized detection network and a simple Gaussian
jammer with an average power constraint and a single antenna
per channel in [6]. In this paper, we extend our work in [6]
by investigating pure strategy equilibria in closed form, for a
complete-information zero-sum game between a centralized
detection network and a powerful jammer equipped with
multiple antennas and strict (instantaneous) power constraints.
Consider a centralized detection network where N sensing
agents share raw observations with the fusion center (FC)
which makes a global decision regarding the presence/absence
of the phenomenon-of-interest (PoI) in the presence of a
disruptive jammer, as shown in Figure 1. Let H1 denote the
hypothesis when PoI is present, and H0 otherwise, with prior
probabilities pi1 and pi0 respectively. We model the PoI’s signal
as θ = 1 under H1, and θ = 0 otherwise. In this paper, we
refer to the channel between the PoI and any given sensor as
a sensing channel, and the channel between the sensors and
the FC as a communication channel. We assume a multiple
access channel (MAC) at the communication channel, where
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Fig. 1: Detection Network in the Presence of a Jammer
all the sensors’ messages are superimposed into one received
signal at the FC.
The disruptive jammer interferes with both the sensing
and the communication channels by introducing the jamming
symbols ws and wfc respectively. For the sake of notational
convenience, we stack these jamming symbols together into a
super-symbol w = {ws,wfc}. We assume that the jammer
has a total power budget P , and denote the set of all possible
jammer’s strategies as W , {w ∈ RL+M | ||w||22 ≤ P}.
If αi and βil denote the known channel-gains at the ith
sensing channel due to the PoI signal and the lth antenna at
the jammer respectively, the ith sensor acquires an observation
si = αiθ +
L∑
l=1
βilwsl + ni, (1)
where ni is a zero-mean AWGN noise with variance σ2s .
We assume that the ith sensor transmits its raw observation
si over the MAC. The FC receives the combined signal
rfc =
N∑
i=1
φisi +
M∑
m=1
ψmwfcm + nfc
= aθ + bTw + z,
(2)
where a =
N∑
i=1
φiαi, z =
N∑
i=1
φini + nfc, and
b
T =
[
N∑
i=1
φiβi1 · · ·
N∑
i=1
φiβiL ψ1 · · · ψM
]
.
2Since rfc is a superposition of the PoI’s signal with several
Gaussian random variables, rfc|H0 ∼ N (bTw, σ2) and
rfc|H1 ∼ N (a + bTw, σ2), where σ2 = σ2fc + σ2s
N∑
i=1
φ2i
is the variance of the noise signal z.
We assume that the FC employs a decision rule1
rfc
H1
≷
H0
λ, (3)
where λ ∈ Λ2 is a real-valued threshold designed to minimize
the FC’s error probability
PE = pi0Q
(
λ− bTw
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
λ− bTw − a
σ
)]
,
(4)
while the jammer simultaneously attempts to maximize PE by
employing an appropriate jamming signal w.
II. EVALUATION OF PURE STRATEGY EQUILIBRIA
We model the interaction between the FC and the jammer
formally as a zero-sum game as stated below.
Problem 1. Find the Nash equilibria {λ∗,w∗} ∈ Λ×W that
satisfy the following inequality:
PE(λ
∗,w) ≤ PE(λ∗,w∗) ≤ PE(λ,w∗)
∀ λ ∈ Λ, w ∈ W .
First, we investigate some important properties of PE that
guarantee the existence of pure-strategy equilibria.
Lemma 1. For a given b, w and σ, PE is a quasiconvex
function of λ.
Proof: For a fixed b, w and σ, we differentiate PE with
respect to λ and obtain
∂PE
∂λ
= f1(λ) · [pi1f2(λ)− pi0] (5)
where
f1(λ) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (λ− b
T
w)2
2σ2
)
, (6a)
f2(λ) = exp
(
2a(λ− bTw)− a2
2σ2
)
. (6b)
Since this structure has similar properties as that in Lemma
1 in [8], we omit the remaining proof for brevity.
Any channel model with non-negative channel gains ensures
that every element in the vector b is non-negative. Since many
practical channel models such as path-loss model and Rayleigh
fading model have non-negative channel gains, we assume that
b is a non-negative vector in the rest of this section.
1Since this is a likelihood ratio test, all the other rules are dominated.
Therefore, their removal does not result any loss in network performance.
2Although λ can be any real number in practice, for the sake of tractability,
we assume that Λ , [−R,R], where R is a sufficiently large real number.
For more details, the reader may refer to Theorem 5, Page 168 in [7] which
guarantees the existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 2. For a given λ, b and σ, PE is jointly quasiconcave
in w, if every entry in b is non-negative.
Proof: Given any two points w1,w2 ∈ W , PE is jointly
quasiconcave [9] if and only if
PE(w1) ≤ PE(w2) ⇒ ∇wPE(w1) · (w1 −w2) ≤ 0.
(7)
In our framework, the necessary condition PE(w1) ≤
PE(w2) reduces to ∫ y1
y2
g(y)dy ≥ 0. (8)
Here, y1 = bTw1 and y2 = bTw2 are the integral limits and
g(y) = f3(y) · [pi1f4(y)− pi0] , (9)
where
f3(y) =
1
σ
√
2pi
exp
(
− (λ− y)
2
2σ2
)
, (10a)
f4(y) = exp
(
2a(λ− y)− a2
2σ2
)
. (10b)
Given that the values of b, λ and σ are fixed, we differentiate
PE with respect to w and obtain
∇wPE(w1) = −b · g(y1). (11)
Substituting Equations (8) and (11) in Equation (7), we need
to show that∫ y1
y2
g(y)dy ≥ 0 ⇒ g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0 (12)
in order to prove the lemma.
Note that f3(y) ≥ 0. Since f4(y) is a monotonically
decreasing function of y, we have g(y) ≥ 0 whenever y ≤ y0,
and g(y) < 0 whenever y > y0, where y0 is the unique zero-
crossing point at which f4(y0) =
pi0
pi1
. Using this property, we
prove the theorem in three cases, as shown below.
CASE-1 [y0 ≤ y1, y2]: Given that y0 ≤ y1, y2, we have
g(y) ≤ 0 for any y between y1 and y2. In such a case, the
necessary condition given in Equation (8) holds true when
y1 ≤ y2. In other words, g(y1) · [y1 − y2] ≥ 0 whenever
Equation (8) holds true in this case.
CASE-2 [y1, y2 ≤ y0]: Given that y1, y2 ≤ y0, we
have g(y) ≥ 0 for any y between y1 and y2. Therefore, the
necessary condition in Equation (8) holds true when y2 ≤ y1.
As a result, g(y1) · [y1− y2] ≥ 0 whenever Equation (8) holds
true in this case.
CASE-3 [y1 ≤ y0 ≤ y2 or y2 ≤ y0 ≤ y1]: Note that
this is a trivial case. This is because of the following. If y1 ≤
y0 ≤ y2, both g(y1) and (y1 − y2) are negative. On the other
hand, if y2 ≤ y0 ≤ y1, both g(y1) and (y1 − y2) are positive.
Either way, their product g(y1) · [y1− y2] ≥ 0 whether or not,
the necessary condition in Equation (8) holds true.
Given that PE is quasi-concave-convex in nature, a pure
strategy solution exists due to the classic Debreu-Glicksberg-
Fan existence theorem [7], [10]. Therefore, we start by in-
vestigating the best response strategies at the network in the
following proposition.
3Proposition 1. The optimal threshold λ∗ = argmin
λ
PE(λ,w)
for a fixed jammer’s strategy w is given by
λ∗ = bTw + c (13)
where c = 1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
is a constant. Further-
more, PE(λ = λ
∗,w) is independent of w.
Proof: We first consider the inner optimization in the
max-min problem where we minimize PE with respect to λ
for a fixed jammer’s strategy w. The optimal λ = λ∗ satisfies
∂PE
∂λ
= f1(λ) · [pi1f2(λ)− pi0] = 0, (14)
where f1(λ) ≥ 0. Thus, if f2(λ) = pi0
pi1
, we have ∂PE
∂λ
= 0.
Substituting Equation (6b) and rearranging terms, we have
λ∗ = bTw + c (15)
where c = 1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
is independent of w.
Given a fixed jammer’s strategy w, if the FC employs the
optimal threshold λ∗, from Equation (15), the error probability
at the FC is given by
PE(λ
∗,w) = pi0Q
( c
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
c− a
σ
)]
.
(16)
Note that PE(λ∗,w) is independent of the jammer’s strategy
w, as stated in the proposition statement.
Note that the best response strategy employed by the
network, as shown in Equation (15), is unique for a fixed
jammer’s strategy w. Furthermore, the jammer’s signal intro-
duces a linear shift to the point λ = c, which is optimal in
the absence of the jammer. In contrast, when we investigate
the optimal jammer’s strategy w∗ by considering the min-max
framework, we have the following proposition.
Proposition 2. The optimal jammer’s strategy w∗ =
argmax
w
PE(λ,w) for a fixed threshold λ satisfies
b
T
w
∗ = λ− c. (17)
where c = 1
2a
[
a2 + 2σ2 log
(
pi0
pi1
)]
. Such a pure-strategy
solution exists only when
c−
√
P · bTb ≤ λ ≤ c+
√
P · bTb. (18)
Proof: An approach similar to the proof of Proposition
1 can be followed for finding Equation (17). Therefore, we
focus our attention on finding the existence condition, given
in Equation (18).
In order for a pure-strategy solution to exist, w∗ should lie
within the set of strategies that satisfy the jammer’s total power
budget. In other words, we need (w∗)T w∗ ≤ P . Therefore,
the affine function given in Equation (17) should be within the
squared-distance of P units from the origin w = 0. In other
words, we have
(λ− c)2
b
T
b
≤ P. (19)
Note that this condition can also be equivalently stated as given
in Equation (18).
Note that the jammer’s best response strategy is not unique,
as shown in Equation (17). Indeed, there are infinite possibili-
ties since the jammer can adopt any strategy on a line segment
without any regret. Combining the results from Propositions
1 and 2, we have the following main result of this section.
Theorem 1. For every −b ≤ ǫ ≤ b,
λ∗ = c+
√
P
b
T
b
b
T
ǫ, w∗ =
√
P
b
T
b
ǫ (20)
is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. At the above equilibrium
point, the error probability at the FC is given by
PE(λ
∗,w∗) = pi0Q
( c
σ
)
+ pi1
[
1−Q
(
c− a
σ
)]
.
(21)
Proof: As stated in Proposition 2, λ∗ varies between
c−
√
P · bTb and c+
√
P · bT b. Therefore, we first investigate
the extreme points λ∗1 = c −
√
P · bTb and λ∗2 = c +√
P · bTb.
We first consider the case where λ∗1 = c −
√
P · bTb.
Comparing this threshold to the optimal threshold from Equa-
tion (15), we have λ∗1 = bTw + c = c −
√
P · bTb. On
simplification, we find that w∗1 = −
√
P
bT b
b is the optimal
jammer’s strategy. Thus, λ∗1 = bTw+ c = c−
√
P · bTb and
w
∗
1 = −
√
P
bT b
b form a pure-strategy equilibrium. Similarly,
it is easy to show that λ∗2 = c+
√
P · bTb and w∗2 =
√
P
bT b
b
is another pure-strategy equilibrium.
Given these two pure-strategy equilibria, we find a paramet-
ric representation of all possible pure-strategy Nash equilibria,
as given below. Let
w
∗
ǫ =
√
P
b
T
b
ǫ (22)
where ǫ is the vector parameter that ranges from −b and
b. Note that the two solutions w∗1 and w∗2 both correspond
to the parameter values ǫ1 = −b and ǫ = b respectively.
Furthermore, such a linear parameterization is valid because
of the fact that w∗ always lies on the line bTw∗ = λ− c, as
given in Equation (17).
Substituting Equation (22) in Equation (15), we have
λ∗
ǫ
= c+
√
P
b
T
b
b
T
ǫ. (23)
Since the equilibrium point satisfies the necessary condi-
tions presented in Propositions 1 and 2, the error probability
at the FC is given by Equation (16).
III. DISCUSSION
Since the network and the jammer are non-cooperative en-
tities, we investigate the convergence of the players’ strategies
in a repeated game setting from any arbitrary strategy profile.
We denote the initial pure strategy profile as (λ0,w0), where
4the total power of the initial jammer’s strategy w0 is within
the jammer’s power budget P , and assume that all the players’
strategies are perfectly observable, i.e., the network makes
noiseless observations regarding the jammer’s strategy and
vice-versa.
Lemma 3. Given any initial strategy profile (λ0,w0), the
players always converge to an equilibria presented in Theorem
1 in a perfectly-observable repeated-game, irrespective of the
order of their play.
Proof: We prove this lemma in two cases. In the first case,
we assume that the network takes the lead, followed by the
jammer and so on. In the latter case, we assume the opposite
where the jammer takes the lead, followed by the network and
so on.
CASE-1 [N-J-N-J-· · · ]: In this case, we assume that the
network takes the lead. Therefore, given the initial strategy
profile (λ0,w0), the network chooses its best response from
Proposition 1, which is
λ1 = b
T
w0 + c. (24)
Given that ||w0||22 ≤ P , without any loss of generality, we can
represent w0 in the same form as shown in Theorem 1. As
a result, λ1 also has the form presented in Theorem 1. Thus,
the repeated game converges to an equilibrium point (λ1,w0)
within one iteration.
CASE-2 [J-N-J-N-· · · ]: In this case, we assume that the
jammer takes the lead. Therefore, given the initial strategy
profile (λ0,w0), the jammer chooses its best response as
stated in Proposition 2. In other words, if λ0 lies between
c−
√
P · bTb and c+
√
P · bTb, the jammer chooses its best
response w1a such that
b
T
w1a = λ0 − c. (25)
Otherwise, the jammer employs a strategy w1b = ±b where
the sign of w1b matches to sign(λ0 − c). In such a case, the
network adopts a best response strategy
λ1 = c±
√
P · bTb. (26)
In summary, if λ0 lies between c −
√
P · bT b and c +√
P · bTb, the repeated game converges to an equilibrium
point (λ0,w1a) in one iteration. Else, the repeated game
converges to an equilibrium point (λ1,w1b).
Since both the network and the jammer converge rationally
to an equilibrium presented in Theorem 1, there is no incentive
for the jammer to employ a pure strategy. This is because the
error probability at the FC under such equilibrium solutions is
totally independent of the jammer’s strategy. In fact, the error
probability at the FC in the presence of a jammer is identical
to that in the absence of a jammer (i.e., w = 0).
Given that pure strategies are not beneficial to the jammer,
we now investigate if there is any incentive to employ a mixed
strategy at the jammer. For the sake of illustration, we consider
an example similar to the model in [6], where the jammer
employs a signal w ∼ N (0,W ) and admits an average
power constraint3 Tr(W ) ≤ P . In the following lemma, we
3Note that the support of an average power constraint spans over RL+M ,
unlike the strict power constraint which has a compact support set W .
demonstrate that a simple Gaussian jammer with an average
power constraint has a greater impact than that of a pure-
strategy equilibrium stated in Theorem 1.
Lemma 4. When the network employs its best response
(mixed) strategy to the jammer’s mixed strategy, the expected
utility (average error probability) due to a Gaussian jammer
with an average power constraint is always greater than the
error probability under pure-strategy equilibrium.
Proof: Let us define a functional
Γ(x) = pi0Q
(
x√
σ2 + bTWb
)
+pi1
[
1−Q
(
x− a√
σ2 + bTWb
)]
.
(27)
Given a fixed threshold λ at the FC, the error probability at
the FC turns out to be P˜E(λ) = Γ(λ). Note that P˜E(λ) is a
quasiconvex4 function of λ. In other words, if the network em-
ploys a mixed strategy, the optimal (best response) distribution
is given by p(λ) = δ(λ∗), where λ∗ = c + 1
a
b
TWb log
pi0
pi1
is the optimal threshold that minimizes P˜E(λ), and δ(x) is a
Dirac delta function centered at x. Thus, the expected utility
(minimum P˜E(λ)) due to a Gaussian jammer is
U(W ) = Γ
(
c+ bTWb
1
a
log
pi0
pi1
)
. (28)
Note that U(W ) is a quasiconvex5 function of W , with its
minimum at W being an all-zero matrix. In other words,
U(W ) ≥ PE(λ∗, w∗), (29)
where PE(λ∗, w∗) is given in Equation 21. Consequently, the
jammer has every incentive to use a mixed strategy rather than
employing a deterministic (pure) strategy.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We have modeled the interaction between a centralized
detection network and a jammer as a zero-sum game, and
found a family of pure strategy Nash equilibria in a closed-
form. We have also shown that both the players converge
to one of the equilibrium points proposed, in a perfectly-
observable repeated game irrespective of the order of their
play. Given that pure-strategy jamming attacks have no impact
on network performance, we demonstrated that even a simple
Gaussian jammer with average power constraints achieves
a greater expected utility (average error probability due to
mixed strategies) than in the case of pure-strategy equilibria.
In the future, we will investigate mixed-strategy equilibria in
our proposed framework under strict power constraints. Fur-
thermore, we will consider practical incomplete-information
games where both the network and the jammer has partial
knowledge about the channel gains. We will also study the
effects of receiver diversity at the FC, on the network perfor-
mance in the presence of a jammer.
4Proof is similar to our approach in Lemma 1.
5The proof is similar to our approach in Lemma 2.
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